“Political South Asia” was an invention of the 1980s. It has not survived the test of time. As India’s footprint goes way beyond the Subcontinent, Bangladesh becomes the throbbing heart of the Bay of Bengal and an economic bridge to East Asia and Sri Lanka emerges as an Indian Ocean hub, Delhi needs to reimagine its economic and political geography.
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China wants to invest in big connectivity projects in Nepal but prefers to bring its Asian competitor, India, on board. Some Nepali and Chinese scholars see this as an opportunity for trilateral cooperation between Nepal, India, and China, but Indian policymakers and academics have not shown much interest.
The Pakistan navy is likely to soon place nuclear-tipped cruise missiles on up to three of its five French-built diesel-electric submarines. It has also reached a deal with China to buy eight more diesel-electric attack submarines that can be equipped with nuclear weapons. These are scheduled for delivery in 2028. Even more disturbing, Pakistani military authorities say they are considering the possibility of putting nuclear-tipped cruise missiles on surface vessels like the Zulfiqar.
Both domestic politics and regional dynamics have changed appreciably since Oli last visited New Delhi in 2016 when Nepal was under an undeclared border blockade by India. India felt slighted that Nepal’s major political parties, including Oli’s Communist Party of Nepal-Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML), had failed to take New Delhi in confidence about the content of the new constitution. Nepal’s leaders, on the other hand, insisted that it was Nepal’s internal affair.
Separated from the rest of Asia by the world’s biggest mountains, India is the elephant on its own subcontinent. Leaving aside perennially hostile Pakistan, it has effortlessly dominated smaller neighbours much in the way that America does in the Caribbean: they may grumble and resent their sometimes clumsy big brother, but they have learned to stay out of its way. Lately, however, China’s increasingly bold advances are challenging India’s sway.
The talks between the NSAs demonstrate that the government, to use an American phrase, is not drinking its own Kool-aid about Pakistan. As demonstrated by Modi’s visit to Lahore and the invitation to Pak officials to Pathankot airbase, the government is willing to engage with Pakistan, even at the cost of upsetting its hawkish constituency.
Addressing the legacies of Nepal’s past won’t be easy with the massive challenges that lie ahead: deep-seated political rivalries; ethnic, class, and regional divisions; and a lack of justice for victims of war crimes. But attempting to simply move forward won’t make them go away; it will ensure that they bring greater problems down the road.
Transport cost to import one container of goods for Pakistan has increased to more than $1000 during the last few years. Goods from India enter through border on trucks or train which is very cheap. So while our trade deficit with India may increase, our overall trade deficit can reduce due to cheap imports from India.
The question of a larger Indian role in securing Afghanistan is expected to figure prominently in the talks between the visiting US Defense Secretary James Mattis and the Indian leadership. That Washington and Delhi are talking about collaboration in Afghanistan marks an important shift in the international relations of South Asia.
Often missed in the larger debate on America’s South Asia policy is how it is moving beyond the Af-Pak narrative and addressing other crucial issues besides terror. Numerous other initiatives include reaching out to Pakistan’s Mohajirs, big-ticket projects for Nepal’s development and the recent attempts to address issues of Maldives and Sri Lanka.
