President Joe Biden entered the White House determined to restore the world’s confidence in the United States. That task is particularly important in the Indo-Pacific, a region that has become as central to geopolitics as Europe was during the Cold War. The United States’ presence, influence, and credibility in the region are flagging, and restoring them will require Biden to climb out of a deep hole.
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One of the oddities of Asian geopolitics is that, if China’s neighbors are fearful of its growing hard power capabilities, there is little evidence of urgency in their responses. As China’s People’s Liberation Army has become more advanced and capable, many neighboring militaries have stagnated. If there is a regional arms race, it has few participants and China has won it before the starting gun has even been fired.
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The potential benefits notwithstanding, India’s refusal to accede to the agreement was not entirely surprising. For decades, New Delhi has followed a highly protectionist set of economic policies as part of its historic commitment to a strategy of import-substituting industrialization.
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While China’s many contested border areas may appear to have become more inflamed coincident with its rising global ambitions, the reality is that Beijing has long stoked and sustained borderland disputes as a tactic to win concessions on wider issues with its neighbours.
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The signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the world’s biggest trade pact, by 15 Asia-Pacific countries Sunday represents a victory for multilateralism over unilateralism and free trade over protectionism.
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The term “disruption” is in and of itself neither a compliment nor a criticism. Disruption can be desirable and even necessary if the status quo is incompatible with one’s interests and there is an alternative that is both advantageous and achievable. But disruption is anything but desirable if the status quo serves one’s interests (or would with only minor adjustments) or the available alternatives are likely to be worse.
India is now rethinking its China policy and looking for ways to build deterrence, especially given the disparity in military and economic power between the two countries. And it now has an opportunity to do this by leading a middle-power response to China in the Asia-Pacific.
The Anti-American Century may turn out to be aggressively hostile to the United States, but for now it is anti-American mostly in the sense of being antithetical to the American Century. The three pillars of American strength—military, economic, and political—that defined the last century have each been undermined if not obliterated.
China’s apparent attempt to pull off a cyber heist of critical medical and laboratory data occurs against the backdrop of duelling narratives about the origins and handling of COVID-19. These two issues highlight Asia’s new era of cyber and information warfare.
The more India rises, the more it must expect Chinese opposition, and it will have to also work with other powers to ensure that its interests are protected in the neighbourhood, the region and the world. The balance will keep shifting between cooperation and competition with China, both of which characterise that relationship.
