For years, the U.S.-led peace process has focussed its energies on the roughly 40 percent of the West Bank in which the PA operates, while basically ignoring Gaza and East Jerusalem—the former because it was ruled by Hamas, an officially designated foreign terrorist organisation, and the latter because of its sensitivity to Israel. In the meantime, both areas have become regular flash points of Palestinian unrest.
Picture a Palestinian leader in the twilight of his reign. Besieged on all sides and challenged by younger upstarts, he lashes out against Israel, his Arab brethren, and the United States. Other Palestinian officials jockey to replace him, convinced he’s past his prime. This is how it ended for Yasser Arafat, whose insistence on waging the second intifada left him isolated in the final years of his rule. It may well be how it ends for Mahmoud Abbas.
Hamas’ dilemma, much like the one Fatah faced in the 1990s, centers on a fundamental question: What happens when a resistance movement stops resisting and starts governing? Hamas has had almost a decade to answer this question, and in October 2016 it came very close.
The map of the modern Middle East, a political and economic pivot in the international order, is in tatters. Syria’s ruinous war is the turning point. But the centrifugal forces of rival beliefs, tribes and ethnicities — empowered by unintended consequences of the Arab Spring — are also pulling apart a region defined by European colonial powers a century ago and defended by Arab autocrats ever since.
Irrespective of its rhetoric to the contrary, throughout the last four decades, the Egyptian government’s policies towards the Palestinians have signalled a marked departure from its historic reputation as a regional leader determined to challenge Israeli hegemony.
This is the first time the Palestinians have followed through to form a government. It is supposed to reunite the divided territories and prepare for overdue elections after six months.
A cartoon portraying a mother asking her daughter what her fiancé does for a living, which was published in an Egyptian newspaper, says it all. “He’s a career revolutionary,” answers the smiling girl.
What explains Qatar‘s foreign policy adventurism? For one, the U.S. security guarantee gives it room to play in the region. In addition, some policies — particularly those that facilitate discussions between the United States and its enemies (Hamas, the Taliban) — are aimed at making Qatar uniquely important to Washington.
Here is the genius of Qatar, the peanut-sized Persian Gulf state that provides material support to Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood and possibly some of Syria’s jihadist rebel groups, in a single image: A two-cheeked kiss, in public, between Qatar’s second-most powerful man, the prime minister (and foreign minister), Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Al Thani, and Haim Saban, the Israeli-American billionaire who funds, among other things, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution.
