For the past half-century, the United States has essentially dominated international waters in the Persian Gulf uncontested by any Great Power. As in the South China Sea and in the Bab el-Mandeb, however, Xi may have ambitions to challenge the United States and assert its military influence over yet another strategic chokepoint.
The killing of 20 Indian Army personnel including a Colonel-rank officer along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) has set off considerable disquiet in South Block. The “violent face-off,” New Delhi said, happened as a result of an attempt by the Chinese side to “unilaterally change the status quo” along the Line of Actual Control in Galwan valley.
The current crisis unfolding along the LAC appears on one level to be a continuation of the trends witnessed in foregoing years. But this time, there is one important difference: unlike the discrete and geographically localised confrontations of the past, the latest encounters are occurring at multiple locations along the LAC in Ladakh in the eastern section of Jammu and Kashmir, which suggests a high degree of Chinese premeditation and approval for its military’s activities from the very top.
China needs to pick its battles wisely and concentrate on its main opponent the United States, according to a prominent Chinese military strategist, widely credited with shaping the Trump administration’s hawkish views against Beijing. Retired air force major general Qiao Liang said Washington’s open contest with Beijing to contain China’s rise had attracted other parties to join the attack, but he advised the Chinese leadership to avoid being distracted and focus on the main adversary.
Read Here – South China Morning Post
Also Read: Destined For Conflict? Xi Jinping, Donald Trump And The Thucydides trap
The first decade of the 21st century has seen the Chinese military (People’s Liberation Army or PLA) undergo a number of major changes, which many observers around the world have kept a keen eye on. Indeed, among the world’s major military forces, the breadth and speed with which the PLA and the Chinese military industry have changed from the beginning of 2010 to the end of 2019 is quite remarkable.
Readers of the white paper China’s National Defence in the New Era can be forgiven for their headaches as they move from one conflicting statement to another in Beijing’s latest effort to help “the international community better understand China’s national defence”. This best of times/worst of times approach illustrates the difference between China’s own perspective of its environment and actions and how much of the world interprets the same conditions and events.
A large body of evidence in China’s official military and party media indicates the nation’s senior civilian and uniformed leaders recognize significant shortcomings in the war fighting and command capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). However, most of this evidence is not translated into English for public consumption and is not considered in much of the foreign analysis of China’s growing military capabilities.
The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is a step closer to achieving its goal of deploying a full-scale aircraft carrier battle group. In recent days, China’s first indigenously built aircraft carrier, Shandong, embarked on its second set of sea trials. Meanwhile, the PLAN also started sea trials for the first of its massive new Type 055 guided-missile destroyers , reportedly called Nanchang, on August 24.
What better way than this rousing display of naval might to boost the dream of a resurgent China, determined to play the role of a rising great power on the world stage, as well as rally popular nationalist support for the regime?
