The absence of a credible guarantor of peace in Afghanistan is a big problem for everyone involved. For its part, the West has long believed that Pakistan could play that role but is not quite fully exercising its power. In turn, the United States frequently tried to ramp up the pressure on its erstwhile partner.
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Observers of US-China relations increasingly talk of a new cold war. On top of a long-running trade war, the two countries now find themselves in a destructive cycle of mutual sanctions, consulate closings, and increasingly bellicose official speeches. Efforts to decouple the US economy from China’s are underway as tensions mount in both the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.
An armed conflict will do little to resolve India’s security dilemma along the Himalayan border with China. The coronavirus and the economic downturn caused by currency demonetisation, when coupled with an expensive war, however, limited the latter might be, could lead to a serious downturn in an economy that is already bleeding.
Increasingly, governments that are involved in military conflicts are turning not to their own countrymen, but are instead relying on foreigners who they pay as mercenaries. Countries like Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Russia and Iran are ignoring other countries’ borders and sovereignty, sending hired guns into foreign countries because they don’t like the regime in charge, because they want access to natural resources – or because mercenaries belonging to their enemies are there.
Aiming small begins with the size of the “land grab” — typically no more than one province and often much less. The strategy is to seize territory while minimising the risks and consequences of doing so. By aiming small, conquest without war is very possible. Avoiding inhabited areas — taking land but not people — further reduces the probability of provoking violence. China stuck to the script of modern conquest, doing both in Ladakh.
One of the most important lessons Russian policymakers have learned from the Soviet experience in Afghanistan is to refrain from forging local allies in their own image and to instead seek to galvanise partners wherever mutual interests intersect. A case in point is the nexus with the Taliban.
A border settlement between China and India is unlikely in the foreseeable future, and Beijing believes it has little incentive to push for a quick resolution. China’s priority remains crisis management and escalation prevention, until India is willing to embrace a package deal which basically follows the earlier trade between the eastern section and the western section, with the exception of Tawang.
The strategy is to create a war psychology. If China wants to stop India from taking certain decisions contrary to Chinese interests, it can achieve this by raising the risk of kinetic conflict. If Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his inner circle come to believe that war can follow upon their decisions, they will be increasingly reluctant to act and/or even become paralysed. In large measure, this is a subtle and repetitive exercise in psychological conditioning.
The past is not prologue, and the comparisons to war have limits and detractors. Still, wartime analogies can be useful for an understanding of the potential economic consequences of this crisis. Wars last longer than downturns, and the economic cycle in which we suddenly find ourselves is unlike any peacetime cycle we have experienced in the past half century—including during the Vietnam War and in the aftermath of 9/11.
Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and his rival Abdullah Abdullah signed a power-sharing deal on Sunday, signalling the end of a months-long stalemate that plunged the country into a political crisis. The breakthrough, which sees Abdullah heading peace talks with the Taliban, comes as Afghanistan battles a rapid spread of the deadly coronavirus and surging violence that saw dozens killed in brutal attacks last week.
