Perhaps the most intensely debated issue on the outcome of the clichéd once-in-a-decade transition in China that has drawn the attention of the strategic community is the PLA-Party relationship and its influence on the possible outcome of the transition process. The reason for this is not hard to guess – recent reports emerging out of various sources suggest that jockeying for power may not just be restricted to the political elite alone, and that even the PLA Generals are part of the power struggle.
The International Herald Tribune carried a report about General Zhang Qinsheng, Deputy Chief of General Staff of the PLA, as having “lashed out in a drunken rage against what he believed was a backhanded move to keep him from being named to the Central Military Commission” at a Lunar New Year banquet hosted for the Chinese military leadership, prompting President Hu Jintao to “leave in disgust” from the venue. 1 Another report dated 31 July 2012 states that Hu Jintao promoted six top Lieutenant Generals of the PLA and People’s Armed Police (PAP) to Generals, five of whom have a background in the General Political Department (Deputy Head of General Political department and four Political Commissars).
looking beyond borders 